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Abstract
In this paper we first develop a logic independent account of rele-
vant implication. We propose a stipulative definition of what it means
for a multiset of premises to relevantly L-imply a multiset of con-
clusions, where L is a Tarskian consequence relation: the premises
relevantly imply the conclusions iff there is an abstraction of the pair
〈premises, conclusions〉 such that the abstracted premises L-imply the
abstracted conclusions and none of the abstracted premises or the
abstracted conclusions can be omitted while still maintaining valid
L-consequence.
Subsequently we apply this definition to the classical logic (CL)
consequence relation to obtain NTR-consequence, i.e. the relevant
CL-consequence relation in our sense, and develop a sequent calcu-
lus that is sound and complete w.r.t. relevant CL-consequence. We
present a sound and complete sequent calculus for NTR. In a next
step we add rules for an object language relevant implication to the
sequent calculus. The object language implication reflects exactly the
NTR-consequence relation. One can see the resulting logic NTR→
as a relevant logic in the traditional sense of the word.
By means of a translation to the relevant logic R, we show that the
presented logic NTR is very close to relevance logics in the Anderson-
Belnap-Dunn-Routley-Meyer tradition. However, unlike usual rele-
vant logics, NTR is decidable for the full language, Disjunctive Syl-
logism (A and ¬A∨B relevantly imply B) and Adjunction (A and B
relevantly imply A ∧B) are valid, and neither Modus Ponens nor the
Cut rule are admissible.
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1 Introduction
In the recent history of logic there are few episodes as mathematically and
philosophically rich as the development of relevance logics to avoid the coun-
terintuitive properties (sometimes called ‘paradoxes’ or even ‘fallacies’ by rel-
evance logicians) of material implication. Starting with Wilhelm Ackermann
[1] and Alonzo Church [6] in the 1950s, many logicians have studied logical
systems that aim to get rid of irrelevance in logic. Nuel Belnap and Alan An-
derson (among many others) [2, 3] have developed and thoroughly analyzed
the best known relevance logics E and R, for which Richard Routley/Sylvan
and Bob Meyer [16, 15] have proposed a very interesting and intriguing pos-
sible world semantics with a ternary accessibility relation. For the technical
work in this paper the encyclopedic article [8] suffices. Despite the beauty
and importance of this thread of research, we think it is worthwhile to at-
tempt a completely different road to relevance from a more pluralistic and
conservative point of view. We want to look at a notion of relevance that
is as close as possible to existing logics that have no relevance properties.
We study the notion of relevant implication for existing consequence rela-
tions, and in particular for classical logic (CL). We aim to investigate the
position that, whatever notion of logical consequence one endorses, one can
coherently speak of and formalize the notion of relevant implication, without
criticizing the underlying (non-relevant) consequence relation. We thus look
for a notion of relevance that is complimentary and tailored to existing non-
relevant logics, and in this paper specifically to classical logic. R and E are
not tailored for classical logic as illustrated by the rejection of Disjunctive
Syllogism, which is very often (relevantly) used in classical reasoning contexts
(as argued by [4]). At the end of this paper however, it will be shown that
the here proposed relevant implication tailored for classical logic is actually
not extremely different from the standard relevance logic R and could thus
be seen as a contribution to the logical relevance research thread starting
with Ackermann.
LetW be the set of formulas of a formal language L. A (multiple conclu-
sion) Tarskian consequence relation ` (cf. [11]) is a relation in℘(W)×℘(W)
that is monotonic (i.e. if Γ ` ∆, then Γ ∪ {A} ` ∆ and Γ ` ∆ ∪ {A}),
transitive (i.e. if Γ ` ∆ ∪ {A} and Γ′ ∪ {A} ` ∆′, then Γ ∪ Γ′ ` ∆ ∪∆′), re-
flexive (i.e. {A} ` {A}), and formal (i.e. closed under Uniform Substitution).
Remark that all axiomatizable consequence relations are Tarskian. Semanti-
cally, Tarskian consequence relations can usually be characterized as follows:
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∆ is a consequence of Γ iff at least one of the members of ∆ is verified by
each model that verifies all members of Γ, where the precise meaning of the
expressions ‘model’ and ‘is verified by’ differs from logic to logic. Consider
any logic L that defines a Tarskian consequence relation `L.
As an example, consider the CL-consequence relation with multiple con-
clusions. Remember that in multiple conclusion consequence relations at
least one of the conclusions should be true in all models in which all premises
are true. So e.g.
p,¬p ∨ q `CL q, r
`CL p,¬p
p, q `CL q, r
p,¬p `CL
s, p ∨ q `CL p, q, r
but
p,¬p ∨ q 0CL r, s
0CL p,¬q
p, q 0CL r
p,¬q 0CL
s, p ∨ q 0CL p, r
In what follows regular Greek capital letters–possibly with superscripts,
subscripts and accents–(e.g. Γ, ∆′, Θ3) will denote subsets ofW . Bold Greek
capitals–possibly with superscripts, subscripts and accents–(e.g. Γ, ∆′, Θ3)
will denote multisets1 of formulas inW . Where ‡ is a symbol, a set ‡-sequent
is a statement Γ‡∆ and a multiset ‡-sequent is a statement Γ‡∆. Multiset
`L-sequents will be said to be valid iff the set version of the same sequent
(when only one copy is left of each element on both sides of the turnstyle) is
valid.
For example, p, q `CL q ∧ r, s and p,¬q `CL are (invalid) `CL-sequents
p, p, p, r `CL and r, r, r `CL p, p,¬p are multiset `CL-sequents (the first in-
valid, the second valid). If there is no confusion about the central symbol of
1A multiset is like a set, but distinguishes for each element the number of copies of that
element. The union of two multisets has the same elements as the union of the elements
of the two multisets. The number of copies of each element of the union multiset is the
sum of the number of its copies in the first multiset and the number of its copies in the
second.
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the sequent or about its being a mutiset sequent or not, we simply use the
word ‘sequent’.
Let’s introduce our stipulative definition of L-relevance and relevant L-
implication.
Definition 1. A valid multiset `L-sequent is L-relevant iff there is an L-
valid abstraction of this multiset sequent in which none of the premises or
conclusions are redundant. We say that Γ relevantly L-implies ∆ iff the
sequent Γ `L ∆ is L-relevantly valid.
In order to make this definition precise we need to give a definition of
abstraction and redundancy in a valid L-implication. We say that a multiset
sequent Γ′ ` ∆′ is an abstraction of a multiset sequent Γ ` ∆ iff the latter,
or a version of the latter with more copies of some of its formulas, can be
obtained from the former by one or more applications of Uniform Substitu-
tion, where Uniform Substitution is the rule that enables the replacement of
every occurrence of a sentential letter (in the entire sequent) by a (primitive
or complex) formula. Or, more formally:
Definition 2. The notion abstraction is recursively defined as follows.
• Γ ` ∆ is an abstraction of Γ ` ∆,
• Γ ∪ {A,A} ` ∆ is an abstraction of Γ ∪ {A} ` ∆,
• Γ ` ∆ ∪ {A,A} is an abstraction of Γ ` ∆ ∪ {A},
• Γ′ ` ∆′ is an abstraction of a multiset sequent Γ ` ∆, where 〈Γ,∆〉
is the result of substituting every occurrence of a proposition letter in
〈Γ′,∆′〉 by one single formula,
• If Γ′′ ` ∆′′ is an abstraction of Γ′ ` ∆′ and Γ′ ` ∆′ is an abstraction
of Γ ` ∆, then Γ′′ ` ∆′′ is an abstraction of Γ ` ∆, and
• nothing else is an abstraction.
Note that if an abstraction of a sequent is L-valid, then the abstracted
sequent is also L-valid (by the formality of L).
Definition 3. We say that a premise resp. a conclusion is redundant in an
L-valid sequent iff the sequent is still L-valid after that premise resp. that
conclusion is removed from the premises resp. conclusions of the sequent.
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sequent is an abstraction of sequent
p,¬p `CL p ∧ r,¬(p ∧ r) `CL
`CL q,¬q `CL p ∧ ¬p,¬(p ∧ ¬p)
p,¬p ∨ q `CL q p,¬p ∨ p `CL p
p ∨ q `CL p, q (p ∧ r) ∨ (p ∧ r) `CL p ∧ r, p ∧ r
p, q `CL p ∧ q p,¬p `CL p ∧ ¬p
¬(p ∨ q) `CL ¬p ∧ ¬q ¬(p ∨ p) `CL ¬p ∧ ¬p
p, q ` p ∧CL (q ∧ r),¬r p ∧ q, p ∧ q `CL (p ∧ q) ∧ ((p ∧ q) ∧ (p ∧ q)),¬(p ∧ q)
p, q ` p ∧ q p, p ` p ∧ p
p ∨ q ` p, q p ∨ p ` p, p
p ∨ p ` p, p p ∨ p ` p
Table 1: examples of abstractions.
For example, the following are valid `CL-sequents in which no premises
or conclusions are redundant (the reader can verify that the sequents become
invalid as soon as one removes one formula in the sequent):
p,¬p `CL
`CL q,¬q
p,¬p ∨ q `CL q
p ∨ q `CL p, q
p, q `CL p ∧ q
¬(p ∨ q) `CL ¬p ∧ ¬q
p, q `CL p ∧ (q ∧ r),¬r
Whatever formula one adds to these sequents, it will be redundant for
the validity of the consequent. For example,
q is redundant in p,¬p `CL q
r is redundant in r `CL q,¬q
¬p is redundant in p,¬p ∨ q `CL q,¬p
premise q is redundant in q, p ∨ q `CL p, q.
To illustrate what an abstraction of a sequent is, see Table 1.
Observe that the abstractions are multisets: premises and conclusions
may occur more than once. In each of the above examples the multiset
sequents are CL-relevant, because there is a CL-valid abstraction without
redundancy. This does not imply absence of redundancy. Consider that, in
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every valid multiset sequent in which some premises/conclusions occur more
than once, at least one copy of these premises/conclusions is redundant. The
following examples illustrate this redundancy.
In the relevant `CL p ∧ ¬p,¬(p ∧ ¬p), the conclusion p ∧ ¬p is redundant
because also `CL ¬(p ∧ ¬p) is valid, but the abstraction `CL q,¬q does not
contain redundancy.
In the relevant p,¬p ∨ p `CL p, the premise ¬p ∨ p is redundant because it
is a tautology, but the abstraction p,¬p ∨ q `CL q does not contain
redundancy.
In the relevant (p ∧ r) ∨ (p ∧ r) `CL p ∧ r, p ∧ r one of the copies of the
conclusion p ∧ r is redundant, but the abstraction q ∨ (p ∧ r) `CL q, p ∧ r
does not contain redundancy.
In the relevant p,¬p ` p ∧ ¬p the conclusion is redundant because it is a
contradiction, but the abstraction p,¬q ` p ∧ ¬q does not contain
redundancy.
In the relevant p ∧ q, p ∧ q `CL (p ∧ q) ∧ ((p ∧ q) ∧ (p ∧ q)),¬(p ∧ q), one of
the copies of the premise and the second conclusion are both redundant,
but the abstraction s, t `CL r ∧ (s ∧ t),¬r does not contain redundancy.
The idea behind this stipulative definition is that, intuitively, we can
say that premises relevantly imply conclusions iff the combination of all the
premises gives us enough grounds to formally argue for one of the conclusions,
in such a way that each involved statement is useful to establish the validity
relation (i.e. none of the formulas are redundant or, put differently, can be
removed or replaced by an arbitrary formula, without jeopardizing validity).
In other words: there is a formal argument for the conclusion using each of
the premises. We speak of ‘formally argue’ and a ‘formal argument’ because
it is the form of the argument that needs to be non-redundant. The concrete
instance may contain redundancies. The notions ‘argument’ and ‘used’ or
‘useful’ here and in what follows seems to be proof theoretic notions, but it
is not meant that way: a formal argument is here meant as nothing more
than a generally valid (abstract) syllogism, principle of reasoning, or admis-
sible inference rule, in any possible proof system one would develop for the
consequence relation. When we say ‘useful’ we merely mean that it is not
redundant in the employed principle of reasoning. We admit that a proof
theoretic account of these notions would make more sense, but here we want
to stay as general as possible, beyond any concrete logic or proof theory.
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For example, p,¬p ∨ p `CL p is relevant because there exists a formal
argument of which it is a token (viz. A,¬A∨B `CL B) that does not contain
redundancies. So, in some sense, all premises and conclusion of p,¬p∨p `CL p
are useful because they are indispensable in (at least) one way to formally
argue for the sequent. One more example:
`CL p∨¬p, p∨¬p is relevant because `CL A∨¬B,B ∨C is non-redundant,
not because `CL A ∨ ¬A is.
Although this is a stipulative definition of relevant validity, we conjecture
that this is one of the ways in which the expressions ‘together entail’, ‘follows
from’, ‘together imply’ etc. are used in natural language (e.g. in mathematics
or science papers). It seems fair to assume that whenever a scientist claims
that statement (1), (2) and (3) together entail/imply (4) or that (4) follows
from (1), (2), and (3), she means that (4) is relevantly implied by (1), (2)
and (3) in the above sense, i.e. that she has a formal argument for (4) from
(1)–(3), in which all of (1)–(4) are effectively useful.
The advantages of this definition are the following. First, in this sense of
relevance, relevant validity is closed under Uniform Substitution and is thus
a formal relation. For example, because p,¬p ∨ q `CL q is relevant, every
instance of A,¬A ∨ B `CL B is also relevant. Secondly, it can be applied
to every Tarskian consequence relation and so does not presuppose any spe-
cific view on logic or on the meaning of the involved connectives. Thirdly,
it is implicitly based on a reasonable notion of usefulness in an argument.
If premises relevantly imply a conclusion, then there is a valid argument for
the conclusion which really uses each of the premises. If the conclusion is
moreover non-tautological, then the converse conditional also holds. Fourth,
given that there is a sense in which none of the involved formulas of a rele-
vant valid sequent are redundant, there must be a real connection between
the premises and the conclusions. It is due to the premises and the other con-
clusions (or, in absence of premises, only the other conclusions) that we can
obtain any particular conclusion (that particular conclusion is not obtained
independently).
A possible criticism may be that, given this definition, even though
premises relevantly imply conclusions, some of the premises and conclusions
may be redundant (see examples above). Remember that it suffices that an
abstraction of the (multiset) sequent is non-redundant, not that it is non-
redundant itself. This, however, is unavoidable if one wants to develop a for-
mal account of relevance. One can always instantiate premises of a relevant
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form of an argument in such a way that a conclusion becomes a contradiction
or that a premise becomes a tautology (and so automatically redundant). In
other words, if one has a formal proof, based on formal rules, that some con-
clusion follows from some premises in a relevant way, one can always redo the
proof, by uniform substitution, in such a way that the conclusion becomes a
contradiction (unless the conclusion was a tautology before substitution, but
then the premises were already redundant). Such a conclusion is by definition
redundant (if a contradiction follows, anything follows).
One could in principle avoid this redundancy by using a non-formal notion
of relevant validity along the following lines: premises informally relevantly
entail conclusions if none of the premises or conclusions are redundant for
validity. But this does not solve much. Given classical logic one would then
say that p ∧ q informally relevantly implies p. But as soon as we instantiate
this sequent redundancies may show up again. For example, take p to be
‘object a is round’ and q to be ‘object a is square’. This object being a
round square should then informally relevantly imply it being round. But
informally anything follows from the object being round and square (it is
an informal/material inconsistency). So it being round is in some sense still
redundant to the validity. If one also wants to eliminate cases like that, no
(logically) relevant validities remain that are relevant independently of the
context in which they are used. We conclude from this observation that,
if context independent relevance makes any sense at all (and we think it
does), it should be robust under applications of Uniform Substitution. A
consequence of this is that non-redundancy of all premises and conclusions
is too strong a criterion for relevant validity. Incidentally, consider that all
standard accounts of relevance logic are also formal and so cannot avoid
the same sort of redundancies. As an example, one can verify that (p →
(q ∧ p)) → (p → p) is a theorem of the relevance logic R although the
consequent of this implication is itself already a theorem of R.
Let us now investigate this general, logic independent definition for the
concrete case of the logic CL. It is clear that not every valid `CL-sequent
is relevant. As an example take: p `CL p, q, where q is redundant in each
formal argument that grounds the validity of the sequent. Relevant validity
is a much stronger property than logical consequence in general2.
2We use the concept ‘logical consequence relation’ here as it usually used in the litera-
ture, viz. as the relation of truth preservation in the Tarskian sense. We do not want to
claim that the pre-theoretic notion of ‘consequence’ is anything like this. In fact it may
well be that the latter notion is closer to what we call relevant implication than to truth
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Let us see how the definition of relevant CL-implication works in practice.
Do p, ¬p ∨ q, and (¬q ∨ p) ∧ p relevantly CL-imply p? Prima facie, one
may think that it is not the case, because the second and third premise
seem useless. But consider that 〈p,¬p ∨ q, (¬q ∨ r) ∧ s, r〉 is an abstraction
of 〈p,¬p ∨ q, (¬q ∨ p) ∧ p, p〉, and moreover it holds non-redundantly that
p,¬p∨ q, (¬q ∨ r)∧ s `CL r. So p is relevantly CL-implied by p, ¬p∨ q, and
(¬q ∨ p) ∧ p after all. Is this not evidence that the definition flags absurd
consequences as relevant? We think this is not the case, for consider the
following proof:
1 p PREM
2 ¬p ∨ q PREM
3 q Disjunctive Syllogism; 1,2
4 (¬q ∨ p) ∧ p PREM
5 ¬q ∨ p Elimination of Conjunction; 4
6 p Disjunctive Syllogism; 3,5
In this proof all the premises are effectively used to obtain the conclusion.
One could of course object that this is far from the most efficient proof. But
do we want to stipulate that we can only claim that a conclusion is relevantly
implied by premises if all the premises are used in the most efficient proof?
That seems too restrictive. As soon as we really use the premises in the
derivation of the conclusion, they are relevant for the conclusion.
Although the notion of relevance is based on Tarskian consequence rela-
tions, the set of relevant sequents does not constitute a Tarskian consequence
relation. Obviously it is not monotonic: adding premises or conclusion easily
makes a sequent irrelevant. But it is not transitive either. Consider premises
p and q and conclusion p. Although p and q together relevantly CL-imply
p ∧ q and moreover p ∧ q relevantly CL-implies p, it does not make sense to
say that p and q together relevantly CL-imply p, as q is completely irrelevant
for the entailment. Although p relevantly CL-implies p, p and q together do
not.
Let us take a look at another example. It is unproblematic to claim that
p relevantly CL-implies p ∨ q. It is also clear that ¬p and p ∨ q together
relevantly CL-imply q. It is however not the case that p and ¬p together rel-
evantly CL-imply q. While in this case both of the premises are relevant, the
conclusion is here completely arbitrary, i.e. q could be replaced by whatever
formula.
preservation.
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It can be seen from these examples that, whereas CL-consequence is of
course reflexive, monotonic and transitive, relevant CL-implication does not
always satisfy all of these properties (but remark that we do have reflexivity:
A relevantly implies A, in every logic).
Given that we require every premise of a relevant validity to be non-
redundant in obtaining the conclusion, it comes as no surprise that our notion
is non-monotonic (in the same sense in which also logics in the relevance
logic tradition are non-monotonic—for the precise relation with traditional
relevance logic, see below). But it may be more surprising that our relevant
validity relation is not transitive. Many relevance logicians may even strongly
object against the lack of transitivity. It is of course true that, in order to
be able to formalize standard deductive practices, we need some kind of a
notion of ‘implication’ which is (at least cautiously3) transitive. Otherwise
one cannot allow for cumulative theorem proving: it is an established practice
that once one has proven a certain theorem from axioms, one can use this
theorem in further derivations as if it were an axiom, without further proof.
So, to formalize mathematical and scientific theories, we definitely need a
notion of consequence relation which is transitive as the underlying logic of
such theories. But this does not mean that the notion of relevant validity has
to be transitive. There is no fundamental reason why the notion ‘relevant
validity’ should coincide with the notion of consequence that underlies our
theories. Just like it is generally accepted and unproblematic that there is
non-transitivity in counterfactual and indicative conditionals, also relevant
validity may be non-transitive, without this needing to affect the logical
structure of our theories.
Many relevance logicians have aimed to come up with a holistic alter-
native to classical logic (this is clear in the philosophical project presented
in, for example, [2] and [14]). Given that they entirely reject classical logic,
they had to come up with alternative ways to formalize the notion of truth
preservation, consequence, the underlying logic of theories, etc. Here we only
reject the claim that CL-consequence would be a good characterization of
relevant validity. We do not reject other uses of this logic.
Transitivity is a far from obvious property of relevant implication. Con-
sider that we can only say that A relevantly implies B if there is a connection
between A and B. If we know that A relevantly implies B and B relevantly
implies C we sure know that A implies C and that there is a link between
3A relation ` is cautiously transitive iff, whenever Γ ` A and Γ∪{A} ` B, then Γ ` B.
Australasian Journal of Logic (16:2) 2019 Article no. 1
19
both A and B and between B and C. But we have no information about
there being a link between A and C. So it would be very strange that, with-
out further information, it would always be true that A relevantly implies C.
Why then would we even expect relevant implication to be transitive? Might
it not be so that one has always accepted transitivity for relevant implication
(without convincing argument) only because one was so used to it from more
traditional logics?
Note that, when there is exactly one premise and one conclusion, our
relevant CL-implication coincides with Smiley’s alternative concept of log-
ical consequence (see [17, Section 2]) and Burgess’s ‘perfectible’ entailment
relation (see [5]). Burgess begins by stipulating that A perfectly entails B iff
A `CL B, 0CL B and 0CL ¬A and goes on to define that A perfectibly entails
B iff there is an abstraction A′, B′ of A,B such that A′ perfectly entails B′. It
is clear that A relevantly CL-implies B (in our sense) iff A perfectibly entails
B. However in case we have zero or more than one premises or conclusions
(or a different logic), Burgess’s definition cannot be used.
Although we now have given a precise definition of the relevant CL-
implication relation, we have not yet provided a complete logical formaliza-
tion of the relevant implication connective. We have not yet presented how
to prove that something relevantly CL-implies something else. Where Γ and
∆ are classical logic formulas, define NTR by Γ NTR ∆ iff Γ relevantly CL-
imply ∆. In the next section we will present a sequent calculus for NTR
and prove that it is sound and complete.
By means of this formalization of relevant CL-implication alone we do
not yet have presented how the relevant implication relation can be nested
and how it can be related to the usual object language logical vocabulary.
In the relevance logic tradition of Routley, Meyer, Anderson, Belnap,
Dunn and many others (see [2], [3], [9], [8], [13], [14], [16], [15], and [21]),
one gives a formal definition of relevant implication by adding the relevant
implication to the object language in the form of an arrow which can be used
on the same level as what is usually seen as logical vocabulary (conjunction,
disjunction, negation, equivalence, etc.). In the third section of this paper,
we do the same thing, resulting in the logic NTR→. NTR→ will prove A1 →
(A2 → . . .→ (An → B) . . .) (the last “. . .” contains only parentheses) iff A1,
A2, . . ., and An together relevantly CL-imply B. For more complex nested
implications our relevant implication will function much like the relevant
implication of R.
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2 Relevant CL-implication: a sequent calcu-
lus for NTR
We start by defining the (multiset) sequent calculus for NTR.
2.1 Definition
Definition 4. Syntactic consequence. Where Γ and ∆ are multisets of propo-
sitional formulas the only logical symbols in which are ∨ and ¬, Γ `NTR ∆
iff the sequent Γ B ∆ is derivable by means of the rules and axioms listed
below.
The only axiom schema:
AB A
The only structural rule:
Γ, A,AB∆
LCON
Γ, AB∆
ΓB A,A,∆
RCON
ΓB A,∆
The rules for ¬:
Γ, AB∆
R¬
ΓB ¬A,∆
ΓB A,∆
L¬
∆,¬AB∆
The rules for ∨:
ΓB A,∆
R∨1
ΓB A ∨B,∆
ΓBB,∆
R∨2
ΓB A ∨B,∆
Γ1, AB∆1 Γ2, B B∆2
L∨
Γ1,Γ2, A ∨B B∆1,∆2
2.2 Derived rules
We present some useful derived rules, the first two derivable by means of
the corresponding primitive rules plus applications of the LCON and RCON
rules, the last is a special case of the second.
ΓB A,B,∆
R∨f
ΓB A ∨B,∆
Γ1, AB∆1 Γ2, B B∆2
L∨c
(Γ1 ∪ Γ2)− (Γ1 ∩ Γ2),Γ2, A ∨B B (∆1 ∪∆2)− (∆1 ∩∆2)
Γ, AB∆ Γ, B B∆
L∨f
Γ, A ∨B B∆
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The difference between L∨c and L∨ lies in the fact that we are dealing
with multisets. If there is a formula A that occurs both in Γ1 and Γ2, L∨
requires to keep the copies A in Γ1 plus those in Γ2 while L∨c allows you to
only keep the number of copies present in either Γ1 or Γ2, depending of which
has the most A’s. For example, if Γ1 = {A,A,B} and Γ2 = {A,A,A,C},
then (Γ1∪Γ2)− (Γ1∩Γ2) = {A,A,A,B,C}, while Γ1,Γ2 or Γ1∪Γ2 is simply
{A,A,A,A,A,B,C}.
We can define the other traditional logical symbols, as follows:
A ∧B =df ¬(¬A ∨ ¬B)
A ⊃ B =df ¬A ∨B
A ≡ B =df (A ⊃ B) ∧ (B ⊂ A)
Now one can easily derive introduction rules for these defined symbols.
Γ, AB∆
R⊃1
ΓB A ⊃ B,∆
ΓBB,∆
R⊃2
ΓB A ⊃ B,∆
Γ1 B A,∆1 Γ2, B B∆2
L⊃
Γ1,Γ2, A ⊃ B B∆1,∆2
Γ1 B A,∆1 Γ2 BB,∆2
R∧
Γ1,Γ2 B A ∧B,∆1,∆2
Γ, AB∆
L∧1
Γ, A ∧B B∆
Γ, B B∆
L∧2
Γ, A ∧B B∆
Γ1 B A,∆1 Γ2, B B∆2
L≡1
Γ1,Γ2, A ≡ B B∆1,∆2
Γ1, AB∆1 Γ2 BB,∆2
L≡2
Γ1,Γ2, A ≡ B B∆1,∆2
Γ1 B A,∆1 Γ2 BB,∆2
R≡1
Γ1,Γ2 B A ≡ B,∆1,∆2
Γ1, AB∆1 Γ2, B B∆2
R≡2
Γ1,Γ2 B A ≡ B,∆1,∆2
We conclude with rules to conjoin premises and disjoin conclusions.
Γ1,Γ2 B∆
L∧m
Γ,
∧
Γ2 B∆
ΓB∆1,∆2
R∨m
ΓB
∨
∆1,∆2
2.3 Examples
NTR-proof for r ∧ q B ¬p ∨ (p ∧ q)
q B q
pB p
R¬B¬p, p
R∧
q B ¬p, p ∧ q
R∨
q B ¬p,¬p ∨ (p ∧ q)
R∨
q B ¬p ∨ (p ∧ q),¬p ∨ (p ∧ q)
RCON
q B ¬p ∨ (p ∧ q)
L∧
r ∧ q B ¬p ∨ (p ∧ q)
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NTR-proof for (p ∧ ¬p) ∨ q B q ∧ (¬r ∨ r)
pB p
L¬¬p, pB
L∧
p ∧ ¬p, pB
L∧
p ∧ ¬p, p ∧ ¬pB
LCON
p ∧ ¬pB q B q
L∨
(p ∧ ¬p) ∨ q B q
r B r
R¬B¬r, r
R∨B¬r ∨ r, r
R∨B¬r ∨ r,¬r ∨ r
RCONB¬r ∨ r
R∧
(p ∧ ¬p) ∨ q B q ∧ (¬r ∨ r)
NTR-proof for p ∧ pB p, p ∧ ¬p
pB p
pB p
R¬B¬p, p
R∧
pB p, p ∧ ¬p
L∧
p ∧ pB p, p ∧ ¬p
NTR-proof for (p ∨ r) ∧ (p ∨ s) ∧ (q ∨ r) ∧ (q ∨ s)B (p ∧ q) ∨ (r ∧ s)
q B q s B s
L∨
q ∨ s B q, s
q B q r B r
L∨
q ∨ r B q, r
R∧
q ∨ r, q ∨ s B q, q, r ∧ s
RCON
q ∨ r, q ∨ s B q, r ∧ s
p B p s B s
L∨
p ∨ s B p, s
p B p r B r
L∨
p ∨ r B p, r
R∧
p ∨ r, p ∨ s B p, p, r ∧ s
RCON
p ∨ r, p ∨ s B p, r ∧ s
R∧
p ∨ r, p ∨ s, q ∨ r, q ∨ s B p ∧ q, r ∧ s, r ∧ s
RCON
p ∨ r, p ∨ s, q ∨ r, q ∨ s B p ∧ q, r ∧ s
R∨m
p ∨ r, p ∨ s, q ∨ r, q ∨ s B (p ∧ q) ∨ (r ∧ s)
L∧m
(p ∨ r) ∧ (p ∨ s) ∧ (q ∨ r) ∧ (q ∨ s) B (p ∧ q) ∨ (r ∧ s)
2.4 Soundness
Theorem 1. Soundness. If Γs `NTR ∆s, then4 Γs NTR ∆s.
Proof. We need to prove that, for every NTR-proof, the final conclusion
always has a CL-valid abstraction such that no proper subsequent is CL-
valid. We do this recursively.
4The superscripts s and a in Γs and Γa have no meaning, they just indicate different
metavariables.
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This holds obviously for every NTR-proof only existing of an axiom.
The only sequent in such a proof can always be abstracted into the CL-
valid sequent p B p. The reader sees that all its proper subsequents are not
CL-valid.
We need to show for each rule that, if its local premises5 have a CL-valid
abstraction such that none of its proper subsequents are CL-valid, then there
is also such a non-redundant abstraction of the local conclusion of the rule.
We treat the rules one by one. Each time we suppose there is such a non-
redundant abstraction for the local premises.
1. L∨. Transform the non-redundant abstraction of the local premises
by relettering (substitute letters by other letters) in such a way that
the transformed abstractions of the two local premises have no letters
in common. Say the transformed abstractions (which are also non-
redundant abstractions!) are Γ1, A1, A2 . . . AnB∆1 and Γ2, B1, B2 . . . BmB
∆2, where A1, A2 . . . An and B1, B2 . . . Bm are the abstractions of resp.
A and B. The sequent Γ1,Γ2, A1 ∨ B1, A1 ∨ B2, . . . A1 ∨ Bm, . . . An ∨
B1, A1 ∨ B2, . . . An ∨ Bm B∆1,∆2 is an abstraction of the local con-
clusion of L∨, is CL-valid and it cannot have a proper subsequent that
is CL-valid because Γ1, A1, A2 . . . An B∆1 and Γ2, B1, B2 . . . Bm B∆2
are non-redundant and have no letters in common.
2. R∨1. Let Γ B A1, . . . An,∆ be the non-redundant abstraction of the
local premise, where A1, A2 . . . An is the abstraction of A. Take as
the non-redundant abstraction of the local conclusion ΓBA1 ∨ σ,A2 ∨
σ, . . . An∨σ,∆, where σ is a letter that does not occur in the abstraction
of the local premise.
3. R∨2. Similar to R∨1.
4. R¬ and L¬. Evident in view of the fact that the local premise is CL-
valid iff the local conclusion is. Take as the non-redundant abstrac-
tion of the conclusion the abstraction of the local premise such that
A1, A2 . . . An is removed and ¬A1,¬A2 . . .¬An is added on the other
side of B, where A1, A2 . . . An is the abstraction of the formula that is
negated by the rule.
5The local premises of a rule are the sequents that are used by the rule to obtain a new
sequent (the local conclusion). In other words, local premises are the sequents above and
the local conclusion the sequent below the line in the definition of the rule.
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5. LCON and RCON. The non-redundant abstraction of the local premise
is also a non-redundant abstraction of the local conclusion.
2.5 Completeness
Theorem 2. Completeness. If Γs NTR ∆s, then Γs `NTR ∆s.
Before moving to the actual proof, we prepare the proof with some useful
terminology. Let an NTR-tree be a tree of sequents that respects all rules
of NTR, but in which the leafs are not necessarily axioms. We say that an
NTR-tree is an NTR-tree for a sequent if that sequent is the root of the
tree. An NTR-tree is tableau-like iff each rule used in the tree is one of L∨f,
R∨f, L¬, or R¬.
An NTR-tree is completed iff all formulas that occur in the leafs are
atoms. Note that there is at least one tableau-like completed NTR-tree
for each sequent, as we can always further analyse every remaining complex
formula by one of the rules L∨f, R∨f, L¬, or R¬.
An NTR-tree is a proto-proof iff all its leafs are sequents such that at
least one formula occurs both left and right of B. The reader can easily
verify that, whenever there is a proto-proof for a sequent, then that sequent
is CL-valid.
Successor and predecessor (recursive definition). An occurrence O1 of a
formula in a sequent S1 is a successor of an occurrence O2 of a formula in
another sequent S2 iff (i) S1 is the local conclusion of an application of a rule
with S2 as a local premise, O1 and O2 encode the same formula, and O1 and
O2 are in the part of the sequent that is left untouched by the rule, (ii) S1
is the local conclusion of an application of a rule with S2 as a local premise
and the O1 is the result of the application of the rule on O2, or (iii) O1 is a
successor of another occurrence O3 in another sequent and O3 is a successor
of O2. O1 is a predecessor of O2 iff O2 is the successor of O1.
Proof. Suppose Γs 0NTR ∆s. We will show that Γs 2NTR ∆s.
Maximal analysis Given that there is no NTR-proof for ΓsB∆s, all the
completed trees for Γs BNTR ∆s have at least one leaf that is not σ B σ.
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Take any tableau-like completed tree T . There are two possibilities: either
there is a tableau-like completed tree with a leaf containing Γ′ B ∆′ s.t.
Γ′ ∩∆′ = ∅, or there is no such tree.
Not a classical consequence In the case there is such a tree with a leaf
containing Γ′ B∆′ s.t. Γ′ ∩∆′ = ∅, the contents of that leaf constitute a
countermodel for Γ `CL ∆ (let the letters in Γ′ be true and the ones in ∆′ be
false). This can be shown recursively by demonstrating that every sequent
on a branch in a tableau-like completed tree with such a leaf is CL-falsified
by each model that makes all atoms in Γ′ true and all atoms in ∆′ false. Of
course the final conclusion of the tableau-like tree is then also CL-falsified
by each such model.
Irrelevant consequence If there is no tree with such a countermodel leaf,
all leafs of all completed trees are such that there is an atom that occurs both
left and right of B. In that case the tree is a proto-proof and so the final
conclusion is CL-valid. Now we need to prove that it is however not NTR-
valid.
In order to do that, we need to show that every CL-valid abstraction
of Γ B ∆ has a proper subsequent that is also CL-valid. Let Γa B ∆a be
an arbitrary CL-valid abstraction. From the fact that there is no NTR-
proof for Γs B∆s we can conclude that there is none for Γa B∆a either (all
NTR-rules are formal; a uniform substitution of a proof will also constitute
a correct NTR-proof). We will construct a proto-proof for Γa B ∆a with
the special property that if one leaf of that tree contains a sequent that does
not comply with the schema for NTR-axioms, then a proper subsequent of
the final conclusion of the tree is also CL-valid. Because there is no NTR-
proof, there cannot be a proto-proof tree in which all leafs comply with that
schema. We can conclude that, by means of that proto-proof construction,
we will have proven the redundancy of each abstraction of Γs B∆s. We will
be able to conclude that Γs B∆s is not NTR-valid.
Stage 1. First, consider that, since Γa B∆a is CL-valid, there exists a
tableau-like proto-proof T1 for it in view of the completeness of proto-proofs
w.r.t. classical logic (which can be proven using exactly the same methods
used to prove the completeness of traditional tableaux methods).
Stage 2. Then we construct a more parsimonious proto-proof for ΓaB∆a
by removing all redundancies from T1, as follows. Let a pruning of a proto-
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proof be a tree that is the result of removing a formula and all its predecessors
from the proto-proof in such a way that the resulting tree is also a proto-
proof (after one replacing at most one time R∨f by6 R∨c and possibly making
several rule applications empty, i.e. the local premise is exactly the same as
the local conclusion). Now maximally prune T1 (i.e. there is a sequence
〈T1, Tb2, . . . , Tbn−1, Tbn〉 s.t. Tb2 = a pruning of T1, Tb3 is a pruning of Tb2, . . .,
Tbn is a pruning of Tbn−1, and Tbn does not have a pruning) resulting in T2.
Let us give an example of this pruning process.
q, pB p, r, s
L¬
q, p,¬pB r, s q, p, r B r, s
L∨f
q, p,¬p ∨ r B r, s
R∨f
q, p,¬p ∨ r B r ∨ s
First pruning
q, pB p, r
L¬
q, p,¬pB r q, p, r B r
L∨f
q, p,¬p ∨ r B r
R∨
q, p,¬p ∨ r B r ∨ s
Second pruning
pB p, r
L¬
p,¬pB r q, p, r B r
L∨
q, p,¬p ∨ r B r
R∨
q, p,¬p ∨ r B r ∨ s
Third pruning
pB p, r
L¬
p,¬pB r q, r B r
L∨
q, p,¬p ∨ r B r
R∨
q, p,¬p ∨ r B r ∨ s
Fourth pruning
pB p
L¬
p,¬pB q, r B r
L∨
q, p,¬p ∨ r B r
R∨
q, p,¬p ∨ r B r ∨ s
6If one removes an occurrence of a formula from sequents in a proof, it will no longer
be a correct application of the same rule, so one needs to change the justification of the
step in the proof.
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Every further removal of formulas from the tree results in a violation of
rules or another final conclusion sequent.
Stage 3. We recursively construct a specific proto-proof T3 from T2 by
removing formulas and subtrees from T3 such that the final conclusion of T3
is a proper subsequent of the final conclusion of T2. Because T3 is a proto-
proof, its final conclusion is CL-valid, and so the final conclusion of T2 has
a CL-valid subsequent.
We construct T3 following the same tree structure as T2, sequent per
sequent each time mentioning which formulas or even whole subtrees need
to be removed from T2 in order to obtain T3.
First we construct the leafs of T3 based on those of T2. At least one leaf
sequent in T2 contains a formula that may be removed so that the leaf would
still be a leaf of a proto-proof (such as the sequent q, rBr in one of the example
tree in Stage 2, in this sequent q can be removed; rB r is still an acceptable
leaf of a proto-proof), otherwise the tree would be an NTR-proof. Remove
this redundant formula from such a leaf in T2 to obtain the corresponding
leaf in T3. The other leafs of T3 are the same as the corresponding leafs in
T2. Call the leaf that differs the slimmed down leaf.
Now we assume already to have constructed T3 upto a certain point.
Consider arbitrary subtrees T ′a2 and T
′b
2 of T2. Suppose we already have the
corresponding trees T ′a3 and T
′b
3 which are proto-proofs and for which the final
conclusion is a proper subsequent of the final conclusion of corresponding tree
T ′x2 , whenever the slimmed down leaf is in that subtree T
′
3, and T
′x
3 = T
′x
2
otherwise. We prove that the subproof T ′′2 of T2 that is result of applying
a rule R to T ′a2 and T
′b
2 (or one of them, in case of a rule with only one
local premise) can also be transformed into T ′′3 (it is a proto-proof and has as
final conclusion a proper subsequent of T ′′2 ’s final conclusion, whenever the
slimmed down leaf is inside there).
Let T ′′3 be identical to T
′′
2 if the slimmed down leaf is not inside of T
′a
3 nor
inside of T ′b3 .
Otherwise call T ′3 the tree with the slimmed down leaf, and T
′b
3 the other
one; T ′2 and T
′b
2 are the corresponding subtrees of T2. If the rule R has only
one local premise, it suffices to speak of T ′3 and T
′
2 and drop the a and b
altogether.
We construct T ′′3 depending on the rule R used to construct T
′′
2 , assuming
that T ′3 contains the slimmed down leaf and has as its final conclusion a
proper subsequent of the T ′2’s final conclusion. The final conclusion of T
′b
3 is
always identical to that of T ′b2 . We need to treat the rules that may occur in
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T ′2 case by case.
1. L∨c. Let the final conclusion of T ′2 be Γ1, AB∆1, the final conclusion
of both T ′3b and T
′2
b is Γ2, B B∆2, and the final conclusion of T ′′2 be
Γ1,Γ2, A ∨ B B∆1,∆2. There are 3 cases: (1) the final conclusion of
T ′3 is of the form Γ
′
1 B∆′1 where Γ′1 ⊆ Γ1 and ∆′1 ⊆ ∆1. Let T ′′3 be
identical to T ′3, because the final conclusion of the latter is already a
proper subsequent of the final conclusion of T ′′2 . (2) The final conclusion
of T ′3, say Γ
′
1, AB∆′1 is such that Γ1−Γ′1 6= ∅. Then apply L∨c to T ′3 to
obtain T ′′3 , the final conclusion of which is (Γ
′
1 ∪Γ2)− (Γ′1 ∩Γ2),Γ2, A∨
B B (∆′1 ∪∆2)− (∆′1 ∩∆2). In that case either (1a) (Γ1 − Γ′1) ⊆ Γ2.
This is impossible because, as they are redundant, T ′′2 would have been
pruned in such a way that all C ∈ Γ1 − Γ′1 and their predecessors
would have been removed from the subproof T ′2 of the proof (remember
that T2 and all its subproofs are maximally pruned) (1b) otherwise
(Γ′1∪Γ2)− (Γ′1∩Γ2) is a proper submultiset of (Γ1∪Γ2)− (Γ1∩Γ2) and
T ′′3 has a final conclusion that is a proper subsequent that of T
′′
2 . (3)
The final conclusion of T ′3, say Γ
′
1, A B∆′1 is such that ∆1 − ∆′1 6= ∅.
Very similar to case (2).
2. R∨1. Let the final conclusion of T ′2 be ΓBA,∆ and the final conclusion
of T ′′2 be ΓBA∨B,∆. There are 3 case: (1) the final conclusion of T ′3
is of the form Γ′ B∆′ where Γ′ ⊆ Γ and ∆′ ⊆ ∆. Let T ′′3 be identical
to T ′3, because the final conclusion of the latter is already a proper
subsequent of the final conclusion of T ′′2 . (2) The final conclusion of T
′
3,
say Γ′BA,∆′ is such that Γ− Γ′ 6= ∅. Then apply R∨ to T ′3 to obtain
T ′′3 , the final conclusion of which is (Γ
′ B A ∨ B,∆′, which is a proper
subsequent of the final conclusion of T ′′2 . (3) The final conclusion of T
′
3,
say Γ′ B A,∆′ is such that ∆−∆′ 6= ∅. Very similar to case (2).
3. R∨2. Very similar to R∨1.
4. L¬. Very similar to R∨1.
5. R¬. Very similar to R∨1.
6. R∨f. Let the final conclusion of T ′2 be ΓBA,B,∆ and the final conclu-
sion of T ′′2 be ΓB A ∨ B,∆. There are 5 case: (1) the final conclusion
of T ′3 is of the form Γ
′ B∆′ where Γ′ ⊆ Γ and ∆′ ⊆ ∆. Let T ′′3 be
identical to T ′3, because the final conclusion of the latter is already a
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proper subsequent of the final conclusion of T ′′2 . (2) the final conclu-
sion of T ′3 is of the form Γ
′ B A,∆′ where Γ′ ⊆ Γ and ∆′ ⊆ ∆. This
is impossible because, as B is redundant, T ′′2 would have been pruned
in such a way that B and its predecessors would have been removed
from the subproof T ′2 of the proof (remember that T2 and all its sub-
proofs are maximally pruned). (3) the final conclusion of T ′3 is of the
form Γ′ B B,∆′ where Γ′ ⊆ Γ and ∆′ ⊆ ∆. Similar to case (2). (4)
The final conclusion of T ′3, say Γ
′ B A,B,∆′ is such that Γ − Γ′ 6= ∅.
Then apply R∨f to T ′3 to obtain T ′′3 , the final conclusion of which is
(Γ′ B A ∨ B,∆′, which is a proper subsequent of the final conclusion
of T ′′2 . (5) The final conclusion of T
′
3, say Γ
′ B A,B,∆′ is such that
∆−∆′ 6= ∅. Very similar to case (4).
This concludes the construction of a proto-proof T3. Its final conclusion
will be a proper subset of the final conclusion of T2, because the slimmed down
leaf will be inside T3. Because it is a proto-proof, the final conclusion of T3
will be CL-valid. That final conclusion is thus a CL-valid proper subsequent
of Γa B∆a. Given that Γa B∆a was an arbitrary CL-valid abstraction of
ΓsB∆s, there is a CL-valid proper subsequent for every CL-valid abstraction
of ΓsB∆s. Hence the sequent ΓsB∆s is not NTR-valid, or, in other words,
Γs 2NTR ∆s.
3 Adding→ to the object language: the logic
NTR→
3.1 Syntactic definition of NTR→
The logic NTR→ will be a set of theorems in the language with propositional
letters p, q, r, s, t, p1, p2, . . . and logical symbols→,∨ and ¬. The logic is only
defined syntactically. We have not yet devised a direct semantics like the one
for NTR.
The only symbol we add is→. We formalize this symbol by means of the
most straight forward implication introduction rules, to make it exactly re-
flect the metatheoretic relevant CL-implication. The other rules are exactly
the same as the ones for NTR.
Definition 5. Syntactic consequence. Where A is a formula the only logical
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symbols in which are →, ∨, and ¬, `NTR→ A iff the sequent BA is derivable
by means of the rules and axioms listed below.
The only axiom schema:
AB A
The only structural rules:
Γ, A,AB∆
LCON
Γ, AB∆
ΓB A,A,∆
RCON
ΓB A,∆
The rules for ¬:
Γ, AB∆
R¬
ΓB ¬A,∆
ΓB A,∆
L¬
∆,¬AB∆
The rules for ∨:
ΓB A,∆
R∨1
ΓB A ∨B,∆
ΓBB,∆
R∨2
ΓB A ∨B,∆
Γ1, AB∆1 Γ2, B B∆2
L∨
Γ1,Γ2, A ∨B B∆1,∆2
The rules for →:
ΓABB,∆
R→
ΓB A→ B,∆
Γ1 B A,∆1 Γ2, B B∆2
L→
Γ1,Γ2, A→ B B∆1,∆2
All derived rules for NTR mentioned in the last section are also derivable
in NTR→. In the examples we will use them with same names.
We obtain a set of formulas A in the language with logical symbols ¬,
∨ and → such that `NTR→ A. Those are the theorems that formalize the
relevant classical logic implication relation by means of the symbol → in the
object language.
3.2 Examples of NTR→-proofs
We give a couple of examples of NTR→-proof trees.
The first example is the Distributivity (also called Distribution) of con-
junction and disjunction. We mention this rule in particular because the
incomplete sequent calculus for R called LR (see below) is unable to prove
this. The fact that we have more permissive rules for ∨ or ∧ enables us to
derive Distributivity without complications.
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q B q s B s
L∨
q ∨ s B q, s
q B q r B r
L∨
q ∨ r B q, r
R∧
q ∨ r, q ∨ s B q, q, r ∧ s
RCON
q ∨ r, q ∨ s B q, r ∧ s
p B p s B s
L∨
p ∨ s B p, s
p B p r B r
L∨
p ∨ r B p, r
R∧
p ∨ r, p ∨ s B p, p, r ∧ s
RCON
p ∨ r, p ∨ s B p, r ∧ s
R∧
p ∨ r, p ∨ s, q ∨ r, q ∨ s B p ∧ q, r ∧ s, r ∧ s
RCON
p ∨ r, p ∨ s, q ∨ r, q ∨ s B p ∧ q, r ∧ s
R∨m
p ∨ r, p ∨ s, q ∨ r, q ∨ s B (p ∧ q) ∨ (r ∧ s)
L∧m
(p ∨ r) ∧ (p ∨ s) ∧ (q ∨ r) ∧ (q ∨ s) B (p ∧ q) ∨ (r ∧ s)
R→B ((p ∨ r) ∧ (p ∨ s) ∧ (q ∨ r) ∧ (q ∨ s))→ ((p ∧ q) ∨ (r ∧ s))
The next proof tree is for a relevant implication in which Disjunctive
Syllogism is used. The logic R does not have this as a tautology. But
because of the permissive rule L∨ the implication is derivable in NTR→.
p B p q B q
L∨
p ∨ q B p, q
L¬
p ∨ q,¬p B q
R∨1
p ∨ q,¬p B q ∨ s
L∧1
p ∨ q,¬p ∧ r B q ∨ s
R→
p ∨ q B (¬p ∧ r)→ (q ∨ s))
R→B (p ∨ q)→ ((¬p ∧ r)→ (q ∨ s))
Also the next NTR→-proof tree is not valid in R. This time the difference
lies in the rule R∧, which is not valid in LR.
p B p q B q
R∧
p, q B p ∧ q
R→
p B q → (p ∧ q)
R→B p→ (q → (p ∧ q))
Finally we give an example of a situation in which we can derive a clas-
sical logical tautology containing material implications ⊃ (just like R, also
NTR→contains all classical tautologies) but we cannot derive the version
with relevant instead of material implications. For good reasons: q is not
relevant/useful in arguments proving p from p.
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p B p
R¬B ¬p, p
Rb2B ¬p, q ⊃ p
R⊃2B ¬p, p ⊃ (q ⊃ p)
R⊃1B p ⊃ (q ⊃ p), p ⊃ (q ⊃ p)
RCONB p ⊃ (q ⊃ p)
4 Properties of NTR→: relations with classi-
cal and traditional relevance logics
4.1 General properties
We list some easily verifiable properties of NTR→.
1. `NTR→ (A1 → (A2 → . . . (An−1 → (An → B) . . .) iff A1, . . . , An `NTR
B. (→ captures exactly `NTR in the NTR→ object language).
2. If `CL A then `NTR→ A. (all classical tautologies are represented)
3. if A is consistent (i.e. A 0CL), B is not tautological (i.e. 0CL B) and
A `CL B, then `NTR→ A → B. (NTR→ captures the full consistent
and non-tautological part of classical logic).
4. If `NTR→ A→ B, thenA `FDE B and `R A→ B, but p∧(¬p∨q) 0FDE
q while `NTR→ (p ∧ (¬p ∨ q)) → q, whenever A and B are arrow-free
formulas (The implication of NTR→ is strictly stronger than the one
of R and FDE, when linking formulas).
5. `NTR→ is decidable (in the next Section we show how to reduce NTR→-
proofs to LR-proofs and the latter is decidable).
6. A,¬A 0NTR B and 0NTR→ (A∧¬A)→ B for an arbitrary unrelated B.
(NTR and NTR→ are paraconsistent, but remark that A,¬A `NTR)
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4.2 The relevance logic R
In this subsection we simply define and describe the well known relevance
logic R for future reference. TR has as theorems (the formulas A such that
`R A) the formulas derivable from the following axioms and rules (see [2]).
Axioms:
(A1) A→ A
(A2) (A→ B)→ ((B → C))→ (A→ C))
(A3) A→ ((A→ B)→ B)
(A4) (A→ (A→ B))→ (A→ B)
(A5) (A ∧B)→ A
(A6) (A ∧B)→ B
(A7) ((A→ B) ∧ (A→ C))→ (A→ (B ∧ C))
(A8) A→ (A ∨B)
(A9) B → (A ∨B)
(A10) ((A→ C) ∧ (B → C))→ ((A ∨B)→ C)
(A11) (A ∧ (B ∨ C))→ ((A ∧B) ∨ C)
(A12) (A→ ¬B)→ (B → ¬A)
(A13) ¬¬A→ A
Rules:
(R13) from A and A→ B conclude B
(R13) from A and B conclude A ∧B
The logic R has a well known adequate possible world semantic: the
so called Routley-Meyer semantics (cf. [15]). This semantics has a very
interesting philosophical interpretation due to Mares (cf. [12]). There is no
need to give the definition of the Routley-Meyer models here, nor to explain
their philosophical interpretation. For our purposes it suffices that there is
such a semantics and a philosophical interpretation. Let R A denote that
A is valid according to the Routley-Meyer semantics (i.e. A is true in all
normal Routley-Meyer worlds).
There is an incomplete sequent calculus for R, the system LR (short for
lattice-R, see [9]). The only reason why it is incomplete is that it does not
account for the distributivity of disjunction and conjunction.
Definition 6. Syntactic consequence. Where A is a formula the only logical
symbols in which are →, ∨, and ¬, `LR A iff the sequent BA is derivable by
means of the rules and axioms listed below.
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The only axiom schema:
AB A
The only structural rules:
Γ, A,AB∆
LCON
Γ, AB∆
ΓB A,A,∆
RCON
ΓB A,∆
The rules for ¬:
Γ, AB∆
R¬
ΓB ¬A,∆
ΓB A,∆
L¬
∆,¬AB∆
The rules for ∨:
ΓB A,∆
R∨1
ΓB A ∨B,∆
ΓBB,∆
R∨2
ΓB A ∨B,∆
Γ, AB∆ Γ, B B∆
L∨
Γ, A ∨B B∆
The rules for →:
ΓABB,∆
R→
ΓB A→ B,∆
Γ1 B A,∆1 Γ2, B B∆2
L→
Γ1,Γ2, A→ B B∆1,∆2
We have left out the Cut-rule, because there is Cut-elimination in LR.
R is not decidable, but the LR-fragment is. For a discussion of this
property and references to the appropriate literature (by, among others, Saul
Kripke and Alasdair Urquhart) see [9, Section 4].
4.3 Relation between NTR→ and R via a translation
The R-implication is not rich enough to capture what we call the relevant
CL-implication. None of the following forms are valid in R, but they express
relevant CL-implications (according to our definition) in the object language.
0R (A ∧ (¬A ∨B))→ B
0R (B ∨ (A ∧ ¬A))→ B
0R A→ (B → (A ∧B))
0R A→ (A ∧ (B ∨ ¬B))
0R A→ ((A ∧B) ∨ ¬B)
Let ∗¬A =df A and ∗B =df ¬B, whenever B is not of the form ¬A. The
translation tr :W →W is recursively defined as follows:
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TR1 tr(σ) = σ, where σ is a letter (atomic formula)
TR2 tr(A ∨B) = tr(A) ∨ tr(B)
TR3 tr(¬(A ∨B)) = ¬(tr(∗A)→ ¬tr(∗B))
TR4 tr(¬¬A) = tr(A)
TR5 tr(A→ B) = ¬tr(∗A)→ tr(B)
TR6 tr(¬(A→ B)) = ¬(tr(A)→ ¬tr(∗B))
The idea behind the translation is that the implication and the negation
of R and of NTR→ function in exactly the same way. The differences lie
in the behaviour of the disjunctions and conjunctions. Disjunctions on the
left hand side of B in NTR→ work like intensional disjunctions ∨i in R
(A ∨i B =df ¬A → B) while disjunctions on the right hand side of B in
NTR→ work like extensional disjunctions ∨e in R (A ∨e B =df A ∨ B).
Conjunctions in antecedents of→ in NTR work like extensional conjunctions
∧e in R (A ∧e B =df ¬(¬A ∨e ¬B)) while conjunctions in consequents of →
work like intensional conjunctions ∧i in R (A ∧i B =df ¬(¬A ∨i ¬B)).
Theorem 3. Adequacy of the translation. `NTR A iff R tr(A)
Proof. First observe that the fragment of the language of R without formu-
las with conjunctions or negations of disjunctions as positive parts suffices
to capture all translated formulas. Distributivity of conjunction and disjunc-
tion therefore plays no role here. So for this fragment of the language the
sequent calculus LR is complete w.r.t. R. The only difference between the
sequent calculus of NTR→ and that of LR is the rule L∨. In NTR this
rule is replaced by what would be the derived rule7 for left introduction of
intensional disjunction in LR:
Γ1, AB∆1 Γ2, B B∆2
L∨i
Γ1,Γ2, A ∨i B B∆1,∆2
So, to obtain a correct LR-proof we simply need to use the rule L∨i
instead of L∨. This is exactly what the translation does: it translates dis-
junctions into intensional disjunctions in subformulas that end up on the left
hand side of B.
7The rule can be derived as follows in LR:
Γ1, AB∆1
R¬
Γ1 B ¬A,∆1 Γ2, B B∆2
L→
Γ1,Γ2,¬A→ B B∆1,∆2
def∨i
Γ1,Γ2, A ∨i B B∆1,∆2
.
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We do not have a reverse translation, i.e. it is principally impossible
to translate all R (non-)tautologies into NTR (non-)tautologies (NTR is
decidable, whereas R is not), but we do have an equivalence result for part
of R’s language.
Theorem 4. if A is a formula without negative occurrences of ∨, NTR A
iff R A
This can be proven by a straight forward induction on the complexity of
formulas. It suffices to observe that one does not need TR4.3 for the fragment
without negative disjunctions. One can prove that tr(A) = A whenever this
particular clause is not needed.
Via this translation one can indirectly provide the logic NTR→ with a
possible world semantics (using the possible world semantics of R). Doing
this is technically a bit tedious but does not involve any difficulties. It is
however still unclear how to interpret this semantics philosophically. We
were not able to find a good reason why one would, given this semantics,
interpret disjunctions differently depending on the side of the implication on
which they occur.
There are however promising outlooks for an exact truthmaker semantics
(in the vain of Kit Fine’s work, e.g. [10]) of NTR in terms of possible
situations instead of possible worlds. It is an exact semantics in Fine’s sense:
a possible situation only makes a sentence true if the whole situation is
relevant for the sentence.
4.4 Relation with Classical Relevance
The only difference between the logic NTR→ and the logic RR defined in
[22] is that in NTR→ we can derive a relevant implication from a material
implication, i.e. we have (¬A ∨ B) → (A → B) as an NTR→-theorem.
Because, from an external perspective, this may be seen as a fallacious infer-
ence, RR was designed in such a way that such theorems are avoided. This
is done by not translating RR into R but into the logic R2, which is R but
with two non-equivalent relevant R-implications 7→ and →, by means of the
following translation function:
trRR(σ) = σ, where σ is a sentential letter,
trRR(A ∨B) = trRR(A) ∨ trRR(B),
trRR(A B) = ∗trRR(∗A) 7→ trRR(B),
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trRR(¬(A ∨B)) = ¬(trRR(∗A)→ ∗trRR(∗B)),
trRR(¬¬A) = trRR(A), and finally
trRR(¬(A B)) = ¬(trRR(A) 7→ ∗trRR(∗B)).
If we now consider that  is just the standard relevant implication of
RR (for which we use simply→ in NTR→), we can see that this translation
function is exactly the same as the function tr, as soon as we conflate the
two relevant R-implications 7→ and → into the regular R-implication.
The result of this is that NTR→ is at least as strong (and actually
stronger given that `NTR (¬A ∨ B) → (A → B) but not `RR (¬A ∨ B) 
(A→ B)) if we compare the logics by letting  correspond to →.
Although the presented logics in the present paper are very related to
those defined in [22], this paper’s sequent calculus and its general, logic-
independent definition of relevance are entirely original.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have first presented and argued for a stipulative definition
of what a relevant L-implication is, for a Tarskian consequence relation L.
We have explained that the definition is based on being faithful to the logic
L, on the formality of relevant implication, and on the idea that premises
and conclusions have to be useful in some argument for the implication in
order for them to be relevant for the implication.
Then we have developed a sound and complete sequent calculus for rele-
vant CL-implication NTR. We have provided the required metaproofs and
have given some examples of proof trees.
Subsequently, we have added an implication → to NTR that reflects
exactly the relevant meta-implication NTR in the object language. Arguably
the resulting logic NTR→ is a relevance logic in the traditional sense of the
word defining a set of theorems that formalize relevant implication.
Finally, we have listed some properties of the new logic NTR→. (Among
other features) NTR→ turns out to have three useful properties the combi-
nation of which seems counterintuitive: (1) It has classical richness in case
the antecedent is consistent and the consequent non-tautological; so it does
validate i.e. disjunctive syllogism (`NTR→ (p ∧ (¬p ∨ q)) → q). (2) It is
relevant in a reasonable sense (so it has the variable sharing property, etc.).
(3) It is decidable (if one starts from the sequent that should be proven,
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in a finite time one can find all possible proofs by applying the rules in re-
verse, which results each time in less complex sequents). The combination
of these three properties is only possible because the calculus has no cut rule
and so the formalized relevant implication is not transitive (`NTR→ A → B
and `NTR→ B → C does not necessarily entail `NTR→ A → C). This may
seem suspicious in light of 99% of the literature on relevant implication, but
we have given arguments to the effect that one should not expect relevant
implication to be transitive in the first place.
It should be noted that the system NTR→shows some resemblances with
Neil Tennant’s not fully transitive core logic (cf. for example [18, 19, 20])
and with truth-relevance as proposed by Richard Dı´az (cf. [7]). However the
presented system is quite different from these accounts. Tennant proposes a
relevant consequence relation that is classical in similar situations (consistent
premises, conclusion not tautological) as NTR, but does not define a system
of relevant implication, a sequent calculus, or a notion of relevance defined by
means of notions like non-redundancy and abstraction. Dı´az uses techniques
similar to the ones presented here to achieve relevance by pruning tableaux
trees such that each atom needs to be matched by another one without
redundancy (cf. our completeness proof). However he does not develop a
sequent calculus and his system is not classical in the sense that, in his
approach, each symbol becomes relevant/intensional (∨ just as much as →),
which results in a serious reduction of the classical (arrow-free) tautologies.
By contrast, NTR→ proves all (arrow-free) classical tautologies.
The logic we have presented here is a first step in a long term philosophical
project. The idea behind this project is that notions of relevance occurring
in philosophy (the requirement of relevance of explanans for explanandum
in theories of explanation, the requirement of relevance of the antecedent
for the consequent in standard counterfactuals, relevance in justifications,
grounding, imagination, abduction etc.) could be unified by a relevance logic
if that logic is sufficiently close to the deductive logic that is preferred in that
domain of philosophy for independent reasons (mostly classical, intuitionistic,
or paraconsistent logic). To execute this project, future logical work will
include the elaboration of a predicative (quantified) version of NTR, proof
theories of our notion of relevance for other logics than classical logic and a
truthmaker semantics for NTR, NTR→, and for non-classical versions.
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